Multiple servers collaboration technology is the foundation to realize cloud computing deployed in the distributed environments. Service providers could supply massive data and service to authorized users on the cloud infrastructure, instead of maintaining them in the local servers. It is essential for cloud platforms to develop a uniform authentication system, which manages users' access control and authorization. Recently, Irshad et al. presented a chaotic map-based authentication protocol for the multiple servers architecture, which is recognized susceptible to session key recovery attack and identity theft attack. There is an inherent vulnerability in the session key negotiation based on Chebyshev chaotic map-based public key system and the attacker could retrieve cleartext from a given ciphertext. It is the most crippling issue to result the aforementioned susceptibilities. In this paper, we illustrate the faults in Irshad et al.'s proposal and devise a solution with a tripartite authentication strategy, in which we replace the constant T p (x) with a disparate value for each users. Both the formal security analysis validated by BAN-logic focused on the tripartite authentication protocol and the heuristic analysis demonstrate the security reliability of the proposed protocol. Compare to the previous related solutions with the tripartite authentication strategy, our proposal possesses a superior security property and the better scalability with considerable efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing integrates virtualization, large scale storage systems, distributed computing networks and furnishes a service-oriented solution for consumers and enterprises [1] . It enables enterprises and individual customers to access computing/storage services on-demand and profoundly changes conventional commercial model. Cloud computing offers powerful transplantability and flexibility with reasonable prices, and attracts growing numbers of people, corporations and government departments to migrate data and services to the clouds [2] , [3] . Similar to other information network technologies, benefits and security risks of cloud computing coexist. An authentication mechanism for the multiple servers architecture could execute a unified access control management [4] , [5] . It solves the tautological registration problem properly and users could acquire network resources from service providers of the cloud platform with a single registration.
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The registration center located in the cloud owns large-scale computing capabilities and provides registration services for users and servers. Furthermore, it is the credible authority for verifying the authentic of users and servers in the tripartite authentication strategy [5] - [8] , [14] , [18] , [19] . Instead, the registration center never participate in authentication process in the two-party authentication strategy [9] - [13] , [15] , [17] . Both in the tripartite authentication strategy and two-party authentication strategy, users and servers could implement mutual authentication and session key negotiation. No change in the centralized registration tactic of these two authentication strategy. However, each user has to store secret values belonging to different servers in his/her intelligent device if such an authentication system employs the latter authentication strategy. The storage overhead of two-party authentication strategy and tripartite authentication strategy are O(n) and O(1) respectively, where n is the total number of servers. That is to say, the tripartite authentication strategy sacrifices the computational efficiency of registration center and achieves constant storage overhead. Noticeably, the client side still has a good computational complexity in the tripartite authentication strategy, as well as in the two-party authentication strategy.
Chebyshev chaotic map-based public key systems have superiority over traditional public key cryptography and are appropriate for devising lightweight protocols [23] . Many authentication schemes with Chebyshev chaotic cryptosystem are applied to access permission management in the mobile network [12] , [13] , [15] , [18] , [19] . Unfortunately, there is a potential weakness in the design of the session key negotiation based on Chebyshev chaotic map-based cryptosystem, which is fatal to authentication protocol [24] . The adversary can calculate the session key and retrieve the plaintext with a simple method, and we will narrate details of the attack method in the section of preliminaries. Until now, many authentication and key agreement protocols are trivial to the mentioned task and can not provide a secure authentication.
In 2017, Irshad et al. [19] presented a chaotic map based authenticated key agreement scheme in the multiple servers architecture. Their scheme cannot solve the aforementioned problem and is susceptible to the session key recovery attack and identity theft attack. Subsequently, we propose a chaosbased authentication protocol for the multiple servers environment with an enhanced security. In the proposed scheme, the constant value T p (x) in the public parameters is superseded by a session variable T p (y i ), where y i is concealed and unaware by exceptions of participators involved in the interaction protocol. In this way, we properly thwart the security vulnerabilities in Irshad et al's proposal caused by the inherent issue of the session key negotiation based on Chebyshev chaotic map-based cryptosystem. Additionally, we prove that the enhancement is robust by a formal security analysis validated by BAN-logic focused on the tripartite authentication protocol [22] and the heuristic analysis, respectively.
Organization: The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II illustrates the preliminaries of the session key negotiation based Chebyshev chaotic map-based cryptosystem. Then, we presents the working of Irshad et al.'s protocol briefly in Section III, together with elaborating on pitfalls of their protocol in Section IV. In Section V and Section VI, we detail our improved scheme and prove it formally and heuristically, separately. The evaluation of performance and conclusion are drawn in Section VII and Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the knowledge of the session key negotiation based Chebyshev chaotic map-based cryptosystem [23] and its inherent security flaw [24] .
A. SESSION KEY NEGOTIATION BASED CHAOS CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Chebyshev polynomial T n (x) is defined as T n (x) = cos(n × arccos x), where n ∈ Z is an integer and x is a variable from [−1, 1]. The following recursive formulas of Chebyshev polynomials T n (x) = cos(n × arccos x) are given:
Chebyshev polynomial T n (x) satisfies the following important properties.
1. The chaotic feature: For n ≥ 1, T n (x) specifies a chaotic map with a constant density f * (x) = 1/(π √
1 − x 2 ) related to the corresponded Lyapunov exponent ln(x).
2. The semi-group feature: Given a, binN , T a (T b (x)) = T q (T p (x)). The semi-group property is essential for constructing the session key negotiation protocol.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE CHAOS-BASED SESSION KEY NEGOTIATION
In the following, we introduce the procedures that the adversary calculates session key with public parameters and retrieves cleartext from the given ciphertexts [24] .
Let (x, T a (x)) be Alice's public parameters and (x, T a (x)) be Bob's public parameters, where a, b is their private key, respectively.
Alice and Bob can negotiate a session key for the further cryptographic communication as follows.
1. Alice computes T a (T b (x)) with the public key T b (x) from Bob's certificate, together with her own private key a.
2. Bob computes T b (T a (x)) with the public key T a (x) from Alice's certificate, together with her own private key b.
3. Subsequently, they can interact with each other with the session key T b (T a (x)).
However, given an adversary the public key (x, T a (x), T b (x)) and the ciphertext C = T r (x) · M , the cleartext M can be recovered by executing the following procedures.
1. Choose the integer a ∈ P, where P = { ± arccos(T r (x))+2kπ authentication and password update phases [19] . The defined notations used in their scheme are listed in Table 1 .
A. INITIALIZATION
Registration center executes the initialization of the entire system, generates the primary secret key s and a high entropy invariable x ∈ [−1, 1]. Subsequently, it calculates T s (x) and uses it as public key, where x is shared to users and servers by RC. Each participant should hold x in a secure way.
B. SERVER REGISTRATION
Each server registers in RC and acquires the jurisdiction of service provider. Firstly, S j submits its identity SID j to RC for registration. After that, RC confirms that S j is a qualified server and calculates K j = h(SID j s), which is return to S j with x. S j keeps {K j , x} securely.
C. USER REGISTRATION
Step 1: U i imprints biometric template B i and computes q i = h(h(PW i ) H (B i N i )), in which PW i is the selected password and N i is a random number. Then he/she sends its identity ID i and q i towards RC via a secure channel.
Step 2:
Step 3: U i appends the random value N i to the received smart card for calculating q i .
D. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION
Step 1: U i should enter key ID i , PW i and the biometric template B i imprinted by bioinformatics acquisition equipment, and the smart card computes
for verifying the validity of this login. If computed Y i is equal to the stored one, the smart card executes the next procedure; the session will be aborted if the equality does not match. It generates random number n i and computes
. Finally, the smart card transmits the login request {UID i , R 1 , C ik } to server S j .
Step 2: Once S j detects {UID i , R 1 , C ik }, it computes R 3 = T n j (x) and C jk = h(K j R 3 ) with the generated random integer n j . Afterward, S j appends {SID j , R 3 , C jk } to U i 's original login request and forwards to RC.
Step 3: whether it is consistent to the received one. If the verification fails, it implies that the appended login request is illegal. Otherwise, RC continues to compute R 2 = T s (R 1 ),
and verifies
and verify the equality of the computed C ik with the received one. If they are not equal, RC confirms that U i 's request is illegal and rejects it immediately. If the equation holds, RC proceeds to calculate
Step 4: S j receives the reply and computes
Step 5: Upon receipt of the responds from S j , U i 's smart card computes
. Afterwards, U i respectively authenticates RC and S j by comparing C * ki ? = C ki and C * ji ? = C ji . This session would be terminated if either one of these equations does not hold. Both equations are true, the smart card finally calculates C ij = h(R 3 G i SK ij ) and transmits it to S j .
Step 6: S j verifies whether h(R 3 G i SK ij ) is equal to the received C ij or not. If it is true, S j assures that U i gets the correct session key and the total mutual authentication is finished. S j and U i construct the secured communication channel with session key SK ij .
E. PASSWORD MODIFICATION
Step 1: The smart card should request U i to input identity ID i , password PW old i and the biometric impression B i for password modification.
Step 2: After that, the smart card computes
Step 3: Next, the smart card calculates q new
and replaces the original parameters with them, respectively.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF IRSHAD et al.'s PROTOCOL
Noticeable, the session key recovery attack is fatal to authentication protocol, any adversary can retrieve the negotiated session key with the interactive messages transmitted between users, servers and registration center. The session key is used for encoding the subsequent session messages. If the adversary acquires the negotiated session key, he/she can obtain user's accessing data in this conversation straightforwardly. Furthermore, any adversary can recover the username of the victim by launching identity theft attack. The privacy protection is important for authentication protocol, which focuses on concealing users' history tracks, address, contact information and so on. And hence, the identity theft attack will trigger the serious privacy disclosure.
In Irshad et al.'s protocol, all participants in the multiple servers authentication system keep the invariable x and it can be considered as a public parameter. As mentioned before, the adversary can retrieve session key with {x, T s (x)} and this approach is efficacious for Irshad et al.'s proposal, which is based on the chaos-based session key negotiation. In the following, we demonstrate that their scheme is susceptible to session key recovery attack and identity theft attack.
A. SESSION KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
Each party in such a system can easily intercept U i 's login request {UID i , R 1 , C ik } and the subsequent authentication
which are transmitted between U i , the target service providing server S j and registration center RC respectively. He/she can use the analogous public key x to compute an integer n i by
which satisfies the equation
) and the final session key SK ij = h(S k n l ). Obviously, anyone can obtain the plaintext exchanged between U i and S j with the recovered session key. That is, the session key negotiation in Irshad et al.'s protocol may not make sense.
B. IDENTITY THEFT ATTACK
As explained in IV-A, the adversary can perform the same procedures to recover n i , which satisfies constrained equation
. Even if such an integer n i is not equal to the original one, it also supersedes n i to compute the critical parameter
And hence, Irshad et al.'s protocol can not provide the identity privacy.
V. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
Herein, we continue to employ tripartite authentication strategy and propose a construction for multiple servers authentication. In contrast to Irshad et al.'s protocol [19] , we no longer use the an unchanging value x as the analogous public key and distribute it to all parties in such a multiple servers authentication system. A session variable supersedes x in the original protocol to apply for session key negotiation and it is available to handle the aforementioned security issues. The proposed protocol is also comprised of initialization, server registration, user registration, login & authentication and password modification phases.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, registration center RC generates two primary secret keys sl, sr ∈ Z with 1024 bits, which are only known to RC.
B. SERVER REGISTRATION
Such a multiple servers authentication system possesses extendibility and allows servers to perform registration procedures at any time. Firstly, S j should submit its identity SID j to RC in the plaintext format for acquiring jurisdiction for providing services. RC verifies whether or not S j should be qualified for gaining the requested jurisdiction. If so, RC calculates K j = h(SID j sl) and responses to S j ; otherwise, RC returns failure with reasons. K j is the authorization secret key of S j and should be kept safely.
C. USER REGISTRATION
Step 1: U i selects username ID i , password PW i and imprints biometric template B i for generating registration request parameter q i = h(ID i PW i B i N i ), where N i is a included random value. After that, {ID i , q i } is transmitted towards RC over an authenticated communication channel.
Step 2: RC generates a random number N r to calculate received registration request. Finally, it commits X i to smart card memory and issues this card to U i .
Step 3: U i keys in ID i , password PW i , the imprinted B i , N i and q i on the smart card. The smart card computes the verification value V i = h(q i (X i ⊕ q i )) = h(q i z i ) and appends it with NID i into the memory.
D. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
This phase is shown in Figure 2 .
Step 1: U i should imprint the biometric template B i on the bioinformatics acquisition equipment and enters username ID i , password PW i , B i into the smart card. It computes
) and verifies whether V * i equals the stored one or not to confirm the input parameters correctness locally. If the equation holds, proceeds to perform Step 2; otherwise, U i is requested to reenter these values. The smart card has a password protect function and it locks out the login procedure if U i fails to enter ID i , PW i , B i three times in a row. After that, the smart card continues to select random numbers n i1 and n i2 and compute
. Subsequently, the smart card transmits the login request message
Step 2: Once a login request is received from U i , the parameters R 1 , G i are tentatively stored in the memory databases. Then, S j computes C j = h(NID i SID j E j K j ) and appends it to U i 's partial login request, and forwards the authentication
Step 3: Once S j 's authentication request is detected,
Next, RC is commissioned to affirm the legitimacy of S j and U i by verifying C * i ? = C i and C * j ? = C j , respectively. Either equation is false indicates that this authentication request is invalid, RC will abort this session and return an error. If these two equation are holds simultaneously, RC proceeds to calculate
where N r and n r1 are generated random numbers. Finally, RC returns the reply mutual authentication
Step 4:
and verifies the validity of RC and U i by checking T * j ? = T j , G * i ? = G i . S j assures that RC and U i are authentic if the judgment criterion hold. Subsequently, S j generates a random number n j1 and computes R 2 = T n j1 (Y i ),
, v ij , T i } towards to U i for session negotiation. Note that, S j will abort this session and report U i an error if it receives error from RC or the aforementioned verification fails in this step.
Step 5: U i receives the response from S j , U i recovers NID i from CN i by calculating NID i = CN i ⊕ h(Y i z i ), and proceeds to compute
. U i respectively authenticate RC and S j by verifying T * i ? = T i and v ij ? = v ij . Either one is raised false, this session would be terminated and return an error to S j . Otherwise, the smart card calculates the session key test value st j = h(R 1 R 2 SID j Y i SK ij ) and sends it to S j .
Step 6: S j computes h(R 1 R 2 SID j Y i SK ij ) and checks that it is consistent with the received one as expected. If they are equal, S j assures that U i has obtained the negotiated session key and can provide information services by the constructed communication channel.
E. PASSWORD MODIFICATION
Step 1: The smart card should prompt U i to key in ID i and PW i and B i for confirming the validation of password modification request locally.
Step 2: Next, the smart card performs validation by verifying the consistency of the computed h(q i (X i ⊕ q i )) and the stored V i , where q i = h(ID i PW i B i N i ). If they are equal, it invokes the password modification module and prompts U i to input new password PW new i ; otherwise, it prompts that the input username, password and biometric template do not match and them should be re-typed. Noticeably, three times continuous entered these values would activate the protection module and the password modification module will be locked.
Step 3: Finally, the smart card calculates q new
) and replaces the original parameters with them, respectively.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION A. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN-LOGIC
In this section, we employ BAN-logic for tripartite authentication protocol to prove the completeness of the proposed construction of the multiple servers authentication system [22] .
In the following, we list the notations and their implications for the subsequent security analysis. 1) P |≡ X : The principal P confirms that the statement X is believable. 2) (X ): The formula X is recognized fresh. 3) P ⇒ X : The principal P is recognized that has jurisdiction to produce the statement X . 4) P X : The statement X is received by the principal P. 5) P |∼ X : The principal P sends the statement X to others previously. 6) (X , Y): This message contains the statements X and Y. 7) X Y : The formula X is combined with the secret Y. 8) {X } Y : The formula X is encrypted with the secret Y. P X , P|≡Q|∼(X ,Y) P|≡Q|∼X . We define the authentication goals for the proposed construction and we will demonstrate that U i and S j would negotiate a session key.
We define the following the idealized messages transfered between tripartite principles in the proposed construction.
we define the assumptions for validating the proposed construction.
Based on the aforementioned idealized message sequences and assumptions we defined, we would prove that the proposed construction satisfies mutually authentication.
RC receives m 2 , we could demonstrate:
Based on the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 3 and the message-meaning rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 4 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, we could demonstrate:
) and the nonce-verification rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 5 and the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate:
RC |≡ (Y i , NID i ). Based on the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate: RC |≡ Y i . S j receives the message m 3 , we can prove:
From the assumption a 2 and the message-meaning rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 6 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, we could demonstrate:
From S j |≡ RC |∼ (n r1 , U i Y i S j ) and the nonceverification rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 8 and the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate:
U i receives message m 4 , we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 1 and the message-meaning rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 7 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, we could demonstrate: R 2 ) and the nonce-verification rule, we could demonstrate:
From the assumption a 9 and the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate:
Due to the session key SK ij = h(T n i1 (R 2 ) R 1 R 2 Y i ) and the assumption a 10 , we could demonstrate:
←→ S j ) (Goal 1). S j receives the message m 5 , we could demonstrate:
and message-meaning rule, we could demonstrate:
. From the assumption a 11 and the freshness-conjuncatenation rule, we could demonstrate:
←→ S j ) and the nonce-verification rule, we could demonstrate:
From assumption a 12 and the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate:
. Based on the jurisdiction rule, we could demonstrate: S j |≡ (U i SK ←→ S j ) (Goal 2).
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
Herein, we present informal security analysis of the proposed construction to demonstrate that it is immune to a series of possible network attacks and achieves some beneficial security properties.
1) RESISTANCE TO IDENTITY THEFT ATTACK
As mentioned before, there is an inherent vulnerability in the session key negotiation based on Chebyshev chaotic mapbased public key systems. In Irshad et al.'s protocol based on the Chaos-based session key negotiation, any adversary can retrieve the username of the victim straightforwardly. To address this issue, we use a a session variable NID i = E sr (ID i N r ) for login request, where sr is the secret value kept by RC only. It means that only the registration center can decode NID i and acquire the real username. Even if the adversary records all the U i 's login requests, he/she also can not obtain any information about U i 's identity, which is invoked by blind number N r . Hence, the proposed construction can resist identity theft attack.
2) RESISTANCE TO OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
The off-line password guessing attack is an effective mean for the adversary to use a brute force search with dictionary words. We introduce the biometric validation for confirming user legality locally in our construction, and realize three factor authentication (username, password, biometric). Even if the adversary breaches the smart card and compromises the credentials {NID i , X i , V i } stored in its memory [20] , [21] , where V i = h(q i (X i ⊕ q i )), he/she has to crack the invoked username ID i , password PW i and biometric template B i in q i = h(ID i PW i B i N i ). The adversary only seek out the matched ID i , PW i and B i simultaneously to accomplish the off-line password guessing and it is a infeasible in the polynomial time. Thereby, our construction achieves resistance of this attack with smart card breach.
3) RESISTANCE TO IMPERSONATION ATTACK
The weakness of authentication system in impersonation attack would give the opportunity to the adversary for unauthorized accessing network services. In the proposed construction, the adversary should forge a login request message {NID i , R 1 , G i , C i , E i , SID j } to deceive service providing servers and registration center, where Y i = h(z i n i2 SID j ),
. From these equations, we find that the session variable NID i and secret key z i are the most important to produce the login request, and these two values are safeguarded by q i which is invoked by U i 's identity, password and biometric template. The aforementioned informal security analysis shows that the adversary can not compromise U i 's username and password, and thus he/she can not generate a valid login request without the protected z i . 
4) RESISTANCE TO SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK
The shortcoming of multiple servers authentication system in server spoofing attack would make any attacker to disguise legal service providing server for supplying malicious network information. According to the regulations, the adversary needs to forge a responds mes-
. U i will verify v ij and T i for authenticate RC and S j respectively. However, the core value Y i for generating these values is encrypted by S j 's secret key K j , which is kept by S j only. In other words, only the adversary compromises K j , he/she will masquerade the corresponding S j . Obviously, it is unpractical for him/her to perform this attack.
5) RESISTANCE TO REPLAY ATTACK
Replay attack is the most common network attack in the multiple servers authentication system by adversely transmitting a previous session data. The authentication protocol can avoid replay attacks by employing timestamp and random number in each session transmission. In the proposed construction, each session messages is dynamic by tagging with varied component number between user U i , service providing server S j and registration center RC. Any replayed message can not be passed the verification by each participant in such a system. Therefore, the proposed protocol is effective to replay attack.
6) PRESERVING FORWARD SECRECY
It is essential for multiple servers authentication system to possess such an outstanding property -forward secrecy, the compromise of long term keys will not effect any previous session key. In the proposed construction, U i and S j negotiate the session key SK ij = h(T n j1 (R 1 ) R 1 R 2 ) with random numbers n i1 , n i2 and n j1 , which are produced by U i and S j independently. These three random numbers are unaccessible for others and the adversary is impossible to recover the negotiated session key SK ij . Consequently, the proposed protocol for multiple servers architecture provides the forward secrecy.
7) RESISTANCE TO SESSION KEY RECOVERY ATTACK
The vulnerability in the chaos-based session key negotiation makes that Irshad et al.'s protocol can not resist session key recovery attack, any adversary can retrieve the session key after the authentication and key agreement procedures. In the proposed scheme, we replace the constant value x with a disparate value Y i for each users. Furthermore, Y i is combined random nonce n i2 and it is varied in each session. In the login and authentication phase, the service providing server S j recovers Y i from G j with its secret key K j and calculates the session key SK ij = h(T n j1 (R 1 )
Obviously, it is extremely rough to acquire Y i for performing such an attack. Hence, our construction can withstand session key recovery attack.
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
We present the summarization of the comparisons in terms of security functionalities and computation complexity. Table 2 and Table 3 respectively show that the comparisons of security properties and computational consumption with other related solutions [12] , [18] , [19] .
From Table 2 , it is visible that our scheme can be immune to the listed attacks and flaws which are suffered by other works. Furthermore, the proposed construction achieves forward secrecy and is validated by the formal proof of BAN-logic for tripartite authentication protocol. The informal security analysis is also provided to reason the proposed multiple servers authentication protocol. The informal and formal security analysis both conclude that our construction offers superior security.
In Table 3 , i, T h , T sym and T c denote that the size of the transmitted element between entities in the system, the complexity for performing one collision resistant hash function, symmetric encryption/decryption and Chebyshev polynomial. As illustrated in Table 3 VOLUME 7, 2019 authentication between the user, the service providing server and the registration center. Obviously, our construction is equipped with greater efficiency. We employs SHA-256 and advanced encryption standard to implement hash function and symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm respectively, which are implemented at Ubuntu 16.04 system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU @ 3.30GHZ with 3300MB RAM. Note that, we simulate the chebyshev polynomial T n (x) = 2xT n−1 (x)−T n−2 (x) (n ≥ 2) with the iteration steps proposed in II-A at the aforementioned experimentation environment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate Irshad et al.'s multiple servers authentication protocol using chaos-based session key negotiation. Their scheme was plagued by session key recovery attack and identity theft attack, which were triggered by the inherent vulnerabilities in the session key negotiation based on Chebyshev chaotic map-based public key systems. For rectifying these issues addressed in their proposal, we identify the concrete crux of the aforementioned susceptibilities and present an improvement with tripartite authentication strategy. Noticeable, we replace the constant value x with a session variate Y i and solve the session defect of chaos-based session key negotiation. Subsequently, we employ the BANlogic for tripartite authentication protocol to validate the proposed construction. Compare to previous related protocols, our solution has superior performance with considerable efficiency and is better suitable for practical application. QIAOYAN WEN received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, China, in 1981 and 1984, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in cryptography from Xidian University, Xi'an, in 1997. She is currently a Professor with the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications. Her current research interests include coding theory, cryptography, information security, the Internet security, and applied mathematics.
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